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I. INTRODUCTION
The latter half of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century
have seen the scientific community’s understanding of biological materials and processes
progress at a blistering pace.1 In the 1950s, scientists had established little more than the
basic structure and function of DNA. 2 Some six decades later, it is now common practice
for researchers to pinpoint the exact location of a single protein’s genetic material within
the human genome and isolate the corresponding segment of DNA, commonly termed a
“gene,” from the remainder of the genome.3 The location and isolation of human genes has
wide-ranging utility in scientific and medical communities, and is particularly valuable in

1. Elizabeth Bailey, Products of Human Ingenuity: The Isolation and Purification of Genes Under the Natural Product Doctrine, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 25, 25 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCI. 239
(2005).
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the domain of clinical genetic testing, where clinicians can determine patients’ susceptibility to various genetically inherited diseases. 4
Just as science has evolved, so too have the views of researchers regarding the acceptability of patenting various types of discoveries. 5 In particular, the patenting of genes
has become a polarizing topic over the last several decades, garnering attention from the
media and strong opinions from both supporters and opponents of the practice. 6 Tensions
concerning genetic patents reached a high point with the Supreme Court case Association
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.7 In the early 1990s, Myriad Genetics (“Myriad”) was one of several research groups participating in the race to locate two genes,
BRCA1 and BRCA2, associated with susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancers. 8 After
Myriad won this race, it procured multiple patents9 relating to these genes and aggressively
enforced its rights pursuant to those patents.10 Myriad’s actions forced several genetic testing facilities and researchers to discontinue their BRCA-related testing and research and
limited patients’ access to its genetic testing services.11 Subsequently, a variety of individuals and organizations filed suit seeking invalidation of Myriad’s patents. 12
After several decisions from lower courts, including two from the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court accepted the case to decide one question: Are
human genes patentable?13 This issue’s resolution turned primarily on whether the patents
fell under the “product of nature” exception to the scope of subject matter eligible for
patent according to Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952.14 In a landmark decision, the
Court held that isolated segments of DNA are not eligible for patent, while synthetically
created molecules of cDNA are patent eligible. 15
A full discussion of the issues associated with genetic patents and the effects of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad is beyond the scope of this comment, which focuses
primarily on the role of innovation policy in the resolution of patent law cases. 16 In order
4. Allen C. Nunnally, Commercialized Genetic Testing: The Role of Corporate Biotechnology in the New
Genetic Age, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 306, 307 (2002).
5. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 77, 109-15 (1999).
6. David H. Ledbetter, Gene patenting and licensing: the role of academic researchers and advocacy
groups, 10 GENETICS MED. 314, 314 (2008).
7. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
8. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 201 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
9. U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S.
Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No.
5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed
Mar. 20, 1998).
10. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 204-06.
11. Id. at 186-89.
12. Id.
13. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.
14. 35 U.S.C. §101 (2011); Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2107.
15. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2107-11.
16. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003)
[hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers]; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific]; Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U.L.
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to provide the reader with a sufficient understanding of the Court’s holding in Myriad, Part
IIA endeavors to explain some basic concepts of molecular biology and genetics. 17 Part
IIB introduces the topic of United States patent law, discusses its development in relation
to the biotechnology industry, and explains in further detail the Supreme Court’s treatment
of the “product of nature” doctrine.18 Part IIC provides an account of the race to patent the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, Myriad’s actions in patenting the genes and enforcing those
patents, and the history of the case as it meandered through the various levels of the federal
court system.19 Part III explores the application of innovation policy to the biotechnology
industry, analyzes the Federal Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s holdings in Myriad, and argues that, although Myriad strikes a desirable balance between the competing interests of
the biotechnology research community, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit nevertheless missed a valuable opportunity to engage in a meaningful discourse about innovation policy and its proper role in the courts’ patent law jurisprudence.20
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Brief Introduction to Molecular Biology and Genetics

The hereditary information of every living organism on Earth is stored in molecules
of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 21 An organism’s cells express its hereditary information
through the processes of transcription and translation, by which cells synthesize ribonucleic acid (RNA) and proteins, respectively. 22 Each protein synthesized within a cell corresponds to a specific segment of DNA.23 These specific segments of DNA are genes, and
the complete DNA sequence of an organism is known as its genome. 24 The human genome
contains approximately 21,500 genes. 25
1. DNA
DNA is a chain-like molecule that takes the form of a double-helix with base pairs
on the inside and a sugar-phosphate backbone on the outside.26 The inner bases form the
“cross-bars” of the double helix and pair in a specific manner—adenine with thymine and
guanine with cytosine.27 Each cross-bar is chemically connected to the sugar-phosphate

REV. 787 (2010); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (1999); David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent
Law Adjudication: Precedent and Policy, 66 SMU L. Rev. 633 (2013); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 771 (2003).
17. See infra Part IIA.
18. See infra Part IIB.
19. See infra Part IIC.
20. See infra Part III.
21. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 2 (5th ed. 2008).
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 7-8.
25. About
the
Human
Genome
Project, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO. ARCHIVE, http://web.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project
/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
26. ALBERTS, supra note 21, at 197.
27. Id. at 197.
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backbone of the DNA double-helix.28 DNA, as it exists in the cell, is packaged into a set
of chromosomes.29 Each person has forty-six chromosomes—twenty-three from each parent.30 Because a chromosome consists of a long string of unbroken DNA, it is essentially
a long string of genes.31
The nucleotide sequence of the DNA within a specific gene determines the amino
acid sequence of a specific protein.32 The amino acid sequence of a protein determines
what three-dimensional structure the protein will take, and therefore, what properties it
will have and what biological function it will serve. 33 Not all stretches of DNA code for
amino acids; those that do are known as “exons,” while those that do not are known as
“introns.”34 Most human genes consist of a long string of alternating introns and exons,
with introns generally making up the majority of each gene. 35 Consequently, specialized
enzymes must remove substantial portions of a gene—the introns—before the gene can be
“expressed” through the synthesis of a protein. 36
2. Protein Synthesis: RNA Transcription and Translation
The creation of proteins from DNA takes place through two major steps—transcription and translation.37 During transcription, enzymes unwind DNA and use it to create a
strand of complimentary RNA.38 Like DNA, RNA is also a chain-like molecule composed
of nucleotide subunits.39 Unlike DNA, however, RNA utilizes the base uracil (U) instead
of thymine and its sugar-phosphate backbone is chemically different from the sugar-phosphate backbone of DNA.40 The RNA molecule produced from transcription is known as
pre-messenger RNA, or pre-mRNA, and contains both introns and exons, like its parent
strand of DNA.41 A process called splicing removes the introns from the pre-mRNA molecule and produces a molecule known as final messenger RNA, or mRNA. 42 During translation, an enzyme reads the nucleotide sequence of the mRNA in groups of three, known
as codons, and translates the codons into amino acids, which the enzyme links together to
form a protein.43 Often, cells are capable of splicing a segment of DNA in more than one
way, allowing a single segment of DNA to contain genes coding for several different proteins.44

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 348.
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3. DNA Extraction, Purification, and Synthesis
A variety of well-established laboratory techniques allow laboratory technicians to
extract DNA from its cellular environment and manipulate it.45 For example, a scientist
can produce a purified version of a specific segment of DNA by excising the specific segment from a sample of extracted DNA. 46 The purified segment of DNA may then be amplified, or cloned, in unlimited amounts directly through processes such as polymerase
chain reactions or indirectly using a self-replicating element such as a virus or a plasmid. 47
Additionally, highly automated DNA sequencing techniques can rapidly and accurately
determine the nucleotide sequence of a molecule of DNA. 48
Complimentary DNA, or cDNA, is a laboratory-synthesized molecule created using
the process of reverse transcription.49 Reverse transcription is the process of extracting an
mRNA molecule from a cell and using it as a template to create a complementary chain of
single-stranded DNA, which cellular enzymes then convert into double stranded DNA. 50
Genomic DNA primarily differs from cDNA in that cDNA contains the uninterrupted coding sequence of a gene.51 This is because cDNA’s synthesis from mRNA molecules occurs
after splicing, leaving only a particular gene’s exons remaining. 52 For this reason, cDNA
is the molecule of choice when analyzing a gene’s protein product. 53
A laboratory can use purified and amplified segments of DNA to detect a particular
nucleotide sequence of interest—most often a gene.54 For example, a scientist can insert a
radioactive or chemical isotope—a marker—into a single stranded sequence of nucleotides.55 The scientist can then use the sequence as a “probe” to find a complimentary sequence within a sample of DNA. 56 The scientific community widely utilizes this type of
probe for the localization, purification, and characterization of nucleic acid sequences corresponding to specific genes.57
B.

Patent Law Introduction

United States patent law dates back to 1790, when the First Congress passed House
Resolution 10—our nation’s first patent bill. 58 Congress passed House Resolution 10 in
accordance with Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which bestowed
upon Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See, e.g., id. at 532-48.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2396 (1952).
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Writings and Discoveries.”59 Congress promptly revised the bill in 1793 to make the granting of patents essentially automatic so long as the applicant filed the necessary papers and
fees.60 In 1836, dissatisfaction with the ease at which patents were obtained prompted
Congress to enact a new bill.61 This new bill created a patent office with the power to refuse
patents if the inventor did not meet certain requirements. 62 Congress substantially revised
patent laws again in 1870 and a final time in 1952, when it codified the Patent Act still in
effect today.63
As noted above, the founding fathers recognized early in our nation’s existence that
a patent system was vital to the advancement of technology and innovation. 64 According
to traditional patent doctrine, patents incentivize innovation by rewarding an inventor with
the right to exclude others from the use of his invention for a specified period of time. 65 In
the absence of a patent system, imitators could lie in wait for new inventions and appropriate them with a marginal expenditure of resources, while the inventor would lose the
full benefit of his ingenuity and labor.66 Consequently, inventors would be less likely to
expend time and energy innovating, and the technological progress of society as a whole
would proceed at a slower pace.67 Additionally, by giving inventors legal protection from
those who would exploit their inventions in the absence of patent rights, patent law encourages the prompt disclosure of new discoveries to the public. 68 Public disclosure of
inventions is desirable because it provides opportunity for improvement on the original
invention and for further discovery—both subject to the patent holder’s rights, of course. 69
Unfortunately, some patents may actually impede the development of “downstream”
innovations that are contingent on the use of a subsequent “upstream” innovation.70 This
distinction between upstream and downstream resources plays a vital role in the success
of the patent system.71 The traditional doctrine is built on a system in which innovators
utilize a freely available pool of upstream resources to develop new downstream technologies eligible for patent protection.72 Accordingly, a patent system’s effectiveness in promoting innovation relies on its ability to maintain accessibility to requisite upstream resources while providing innovators with sufficient patent protection for downstream
technologies.73 In the words of the Supreme Court, “patent protection strikes a delicate
balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’” 74
59. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
60. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2397.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2395; see also Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 16, at 1159.
64. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2396.
65. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 1:2 (2013).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Peter Lee, Towards a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 929-30 (2009).
71. Peter Yun-Hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable
Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 79, 81
(2005).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting Mayo
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The scenario in which a patentable downstream technology also serves as an upstream resource for further innovation and discovery often complicates the balance between these two pools of resources.75 This scenario is particularly common in the biotechnology setting, where patents on groundbreaking discoveries have the potential to inhibit
the development of downstream technologies. 76 For example, a patent on recombinant
gene technology—developed using basic upstream scientific knowledge and techniques—
might inhibit the development of medicines and treatments derived from subsequent use
of the technology if the patent holder actively enforces his patent rights. 77
Another factor that further complicates the intellectual property landscape of the biotechnology industry is the growing tension between the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors of the research community.78 For the better part of the twentieth century, the academic
community, which highly valued the sharing of scientific knowledge and generally
frowned upon claiming property rights in scientific discoveries, conducted the vast majority of scientific research.79 Although the market applicability of fields such as molecular
biology rapidly increased throughout the century, the lack of any meaningful property
rights in research results warded off privatization of scientific research until the late
1970s.80 Around that time, the prevailing view of the legal and economic community
shifted in favor of stronger intellectual property rights.81
In an attempt to create incentives for private firms to develop university-based discoveries into marketable products, and also to protect American discoveries from foreign
exploitation, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.82 The Bayh-Dole Act gave universities the option to seek patent rights for discoveries made as a result of federally funded
research.83 The Act’s purpose was to stimulate economic growth by giving private firms
the opportunity to obtain exclusive licenses to develop commercial applications of university-owned technologies.84 The Act facilitated the development of a “technology transfer
industry” in which universities encourage researchers to pursue commercialization of their
discoveries.85 Universities now file patent applications on many of these discoveries—
which often serve as valuable inputs into further research—then negotiate licensing agreements that allow private firms to make use of patented discoveries in exchange for royalties.86

Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)).
75. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-based Regulation in Patent
Law, 58 EMORY L. J. 889, 895 (2009).
76. See generally, Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
77. See Lee, supra note 70, at 80.
78. Case Comment, Patent Act of 1952 – Patentable Subject Matter – Association for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 388, 388 (2013) [hereinafter Patent Act].
79. Rai, supra note 5, at 89-90; Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1046-48.
80. Rai, supra note 5, at 93.
81. Id. at 94.
82. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)); Rai, supra note 5, at 95-97.
83. See Ledbetter, supra note 6, at 315.
84. See Rai, supra note 5, at 96-97.
85. Anna Bartow Laakman, Restoring the Genetic Commons: A “Common Sense” Approach to Biotechnology Patents in the Wake of KSR v. Teleflex, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 48 (2007).
86. Id.
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Two years after the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to address growing concerns about the negative effects of
inconsistent patent decisions in the regional circuit courts. 87 Although the Federal Circuit
does not exclusively hear patent cases, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the nation’s patent appeals.88 The Federal Circuit substantially strengthened patent rights in basic
research discoveries by liberalizing the utility requirement and holding that DNA discoveries satisfy the “nonobviousness” requirement.89 This increase in the patentability of basic
research, coupled with the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act, led to a marked increase in the
commercialization of biotechnology research. 90
Consequently, substantial tension developed between the growing private sector and
its not-for-profit counterparts.91 The private sector maintains that strong patent rights are
necessary for the attraction of capital investors, who have little incentive to allocate resources to the development of new technologies if those new technologies are readily
available to competing firms.92 In response, the not-for-profit sector argues that the free
flow of information best encourages innovation. 93
To settle these conflicting interests, many commentators have argued that substantial
changes to current patent law are necessary. 94 Some have suggested alternatives to traditional patent rights, including monetary prizes for discoveries, completely new forms of
intellectual property, compulsory licensing to ensure access at reasonable costs, tax incentives for donations of intellectual property to non-profit organizations, and codification of
common law safe harbor provisions for non-profit research entities.95 However, until further legislative action resolves the complex policy issues associated with biotechnology
patents, federal courts must resolve highly technical patent law claims within the statutory
framework of the current patent act. 96
Under the Patent Act of 1952, an invention must meet several statutory requirements
to be eligible for patent protection.97 First, the invention must concern patentable subject
matter, a concept discussed in further detail below. 98 It must also have utility and novelty,
it must not be obvious, and it must be properly disclosed.99 The utility requirement derives
from the language of § 101, which allows the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) to issue patents to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,

87. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; Rai, supra note 5, at 102-03.
88. See S. Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit As an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy Levers, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 749, 750 (2010).
89. See Rai, supra note 5, at 103-09; see also Laakman, supra note 85, at 43, 48-49. An invention satisfies
the nonobviousness requirement if a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains would
not consider the invention to be an obvious change from the prior state of the art. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
90. See Rai, supra note 5, at 110.
91. Indeed, this is precisely the scenario that played out in Myriad. See Patent Act, supra note 78, at 388.
92. Id.; Rai, supra note 5, at 95-96.
93. See Patent Act, supra note 78, at 388.
94. See id. at 397.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
99. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112; see also Rai, supra note 16, at 829-31.
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”100 Utility is generally the easiest requirement to satisfy, since courts merely require the invention to have some form of specific benefit to the public.101 Novelty requires, quite simply, that others did not know of or
use the invention prior to its discovery by the patentee.102 An invention is obvious if a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains would consider the
invention to be an obvious change from the prior state of the art. 103 Section 112 of the
patent act requires the patent specifications to contain an adequate written description of
the invention, which must be sufficiently clear and concise to allow others to make use of
the invention.104
The Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad concerns itself only with the question of
whether the contested patents related to patentable subject matter. 105 In fact, the question
presented in the Association for Molecular Pathology’s petition for writ of certiorari was
likely one of the most concise in the history of the Supreme Court: Are human genes patentable?106
C.

The Supreme Court’s “Product of Nature” Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to the scope of patentable subject matter for “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 107
Scholars and commentators refer to the exception as the “natural products” or “product of
nature” doctrine.108 Two Supreme Court cases, Funk Brothers Seed Company v. Kalo Inoculant Company109 and Diamond v. Chakrabarty,110 provide an adequate introduction to
the Court’s “product of nature” doctrine.
In Funk Brothers, the petitioner contested a patent relating to a bacterial mixture
used for inoculating plants.111 Prior to the patentee’s discovery of this mixture, the mutually inhibitory effects of various species of bacterial inoculants on one another necessitated
the manufacture and sale of each species of inoculant separately. 112 However, the patentee
discovered particular strains of each species that did not exert these mutually inhibitive
effects.113 He isolated these superior strains of bacteria and used them to create mixed
cultures suitable for use on a much wider variety of crops than was possible with existing
inoculants.114
Although the Court recognized the advantage provided by the discovery and the ingenuity of its creator, it struck down the patent on the ground that the patented mixture

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

35 U.S.C. §101 (emphasis added).
WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1:12 (West 2014).
JAMES BUCHWALTER ET AL., C.J.S. Patents §34 (2014).
HOLMES, supra note 101, § 1:14.
35 U.S.C. § 112; HOLMES, supra note 101, § 1:15.
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2011) (No. 11-725).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
Bailey, supra note 1, at 30-31.
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.
Id.
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was merely a discovery of “some of the handiwork of nature.” 115 The patentee’s isolation
of the bacterial strains did not “improve in any way their natural functioning;” the bacteria
still “serve[d] the ends nature originally provided and act[ed] quite independently of any
effort of the patentee.”116 Accordingly, the Court determined that the patented mixture fell
squarely within the product of nature exception to the § 101 definition of patentable subject
matter and, thus, was not patentable.117
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court further explained its position on the “product
of nature” doctrine.118 In Chakrabarty, the patentee was a microbiologist who created,
through genetic engineering, a bacterium that was capable of chemically degrading several
components of crude oil.119 The bacterium’s value was in the treatment of oil spills, and
no known naturally occurring organism possessed the same capability. 120 The Court reasoned that because the genetically engineered bacterium was different from any found in
nature, it was patent eligible.121
The Court distinguished the case from Funk Brothers by explaining that in that case,
the patentee had simply discovered a strain of bacteria that previously existed in nature.122
In contrast, the patentee in Chakrabarty created a new bacterium with “markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature.”123 The Court emphasized that patent protection
is appropriate only for inventions that are products of human ingenuity. 124 Although the
Court decided the two cases differently, the reasoning of the decisions is consistent and
provides the relevant standards for determining when an invention falls within the “product of nature” exception to the scope of patentable subject matter.125
D.

Development of Myriad’s Patents

Throughout the 1980’s, organizations devoted to breast cancer awareness spurred an
increase in public and governmental attentiveness to the disease.126 In response to this increased awareness, scientists from many developed countries sought to identify the DNA
sequences associated with breast cancer.127 In 1990, a group of researchers at the University of California, Berkeley, led by Doctor Mary-Claire King, published a paper linking a
gene located on a specific region of chromosome 17 to breast and ovarian cancer. 128 Dr.
King’s group had not yet determined the sequence of the gene, which was later designated
115. Id. at 131.
116. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
117. Id.
118. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
119. Id. at 305.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 310.
122. Id.
123. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
124. Id. at 309-10.
125. See Bailey, supra note 1, at 32.
126. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
127. Id. at 201.
128. Id.
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Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene, or BRCA1. 129 This discovery led research teams
around the world to intensify their research concerning the specified region of chromosome 17.130 Dr. Mark Skolnick, a co-founder of Myriad Genetics, led one of these
groups.131
While earning his Ph.D. in genetics, Dr. Skolnick met three Mormons who introduced him to the Utah Genealogical Society’s resources. 132 In 1973, Dr. Skolnick recommended linking the genealogical society’s database to the Utah Cancer Registry’s database
to analyze occurrences of cancer within families.133 Dr. Skolnick furthered this effort by
developing a familial cancer-screening clinic, which his group used to study a variety of
familial cancers.134 After Dr. King’s research group announced the BRCA1 gene’s linkage
to chromosome 17, Dr. Skolnick created Myriad Genetics in 1991 after his research
group’s attempts to obtain government funding were not as successful as he hoped they
would be.135
Scientists at Myriad located the BRCA1 gene using linkage analysis, meaning that
the group “mapped” the physical location of the gene within the human genome using
correlations between the inheritance of certain DNA markers and the occurrence of cancer.136 After pinpointing the location of the BRCA1 gene, Myriad’s scientists analyzed the
sequence of the gene and identified the nucleotides that comprise it. 137 Following the discovery, scientists raced to locate a second gene also thought to be associated with breast
and ovarian cancer.138 Utilizing the same form of analysis it used to locate BRCA1, Myriad
discovered the BRCA2 gene.139 However, a substantial portion of the scientific community
holds the view that Dr. Michael Stratton of London’s Institute for Cancer Research was
actually the first to sequence the BRCA2 gene. 140 When all was said and done, Myriad
obtained seven patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which gave it the option to
exercise the exclusive right to perform research and clinical testing on the genes. 141
E.

The Importance of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 Genes

The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes produce tumor suppressor proteins that ensure the
stability of a cell’s genetic material by facilitating the repair of damaged DNA. 142 Inherited
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
132. Declaration of Dr. Mark Skolnick at ¶ 7, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2009) (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
133. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
134. Id. ¶ 10.
135. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
136. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7,
1995).
137. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282.
138. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S.
Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No.
5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed
Mar. 20, 1998).
142. BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (Last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes can lead to an increased risk of female breast
and ovarian cancers.143 Together, mutations in these two genes are responsible for twenty
to twenty-five percent of hereditary breast cancers and fifteen percent of all ovarian cancers.144 The existence of mutated BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes, therefore, contains important
implications for the prevention and detection of breast and ovarian cancers. 145
A patent holder has the option to grant licenses to others for the use of the patented
item in exchange for an up-front payment or royalty payments. 146 In the context of gene
patents, the patent holder has the option to grant licenses to other entities for the use of the
gene in diagnostic testing.147 Myriad, however, chose to retain the exclusive right to perform diagnostic testing on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—a decision the scientific community met with extensive opposition and criticism. 148
Opponents of Myriad’s patents raised the objection that Myriad’s effective monopoly on BRCA testing allows it to raise the cost of the test to unreasonable levels.149 Myriad
offered testing at a cost of over $3,000, while a public healthcare plan in Ontario—which
chose to ignore Myriad’s patents—offered the testing at approximately one third of Myriad’s price.150 Insurance companies often do not cover BRCA testing, and some of Myriad’s testing options impose extra fees on patients who are not “high risk.”151 Another concern involves the lack of options for consumers; if Myriad is the only choice for BRCA
testing, a patient who desires a second opinion is simply out of luck. 152 During the late
1990s and early 2000s, Myriad actively enforced its BRCA patents, sending cease and
desist letters and filing lawsuits against various parties who offered BRCA testing in violation of Myriad’s patents.153 In May 2009, the Association for Molecular Pathology
(“AMP”) filed suit against the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and
Myriad in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking
invalidation of Myriad’s patents.154 A substantial number of clinical physicians, researchers, cancer patients, and public interest groups joined as plaintiffs in the case. 155

143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Douglas F. Easton, How Many More Breast Cancer Predisposition Genes are There?, 1
BREAST CANCER RES. 14, 15 (1999); Pal T et al., BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutations Account for a Large Proportion
of Ovarian Carcinoma Cases, 104 CANCER 2807, 2812 (2005).
145. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
146. Ledbetter, supra note 6, at 317.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 314; see generally T. Caulfield, Myriad and the Mass Media: The Covering of a Gene Patent Controversy, 9 GENETICS MED. 850 (2007); Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2,
and TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N 1379 (2006).
149. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 203-04.
150 Id.
151. Id. at 204.
152. A related concern is that Myriad’s monopoly over BRCA testing leaves it with little incentive to improve
upon its original test. See Ledbetter, supra note 6, at 314.
153. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 204-06.
154. Id. at 186-89.
155. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss2/4

12

Prosser: Myriad and Missed Opportunity: The Role of Innovation Policy in P

2015]

MYRIAD AND MISSED OPPORTUNITY

683

III. ANALYSIS
A.

Innovation Policy in Biotechnology

Although scholars widely agree that the basic goal of patent law is to promote innovation, legal and economic theorists often fundamentally disagree on how to best implement that goal.156 The application of the patent system’s general rules to the unique qualities of diverse industries and technologies complicates this debate substantially. 157 For
example, the cost of research and development varies widely across industries.158 Pharmaceutical companies often invest millions of dollars and spend several years developing a
new drug, while software companies can develop a new program for a fraction of that
cost.159 Consequently, those industries that require vast expenditures for research and development will generally covet patent rights more fiercely than those that require comparatively modest expenditures.160
There are several unique qualities of biotechnology that complicate the debate on
how to best implement the patent system’s goals.161 Biotechnology research is expensive,
takes place over an extended period of time, and often involves a high degree of uncertainty.162 Even when biotechnology research yields exciting new discoveries, the market
value of those discoveries is often difficult to ascertain. 163 Also, imitators face substantially
lower risks and costs than original innovators do. 164 For example, an imitator can easily
replicate a particular molecule of cDNA once the original innovator locates and isolates
the underlying DNA sequence.165 The combination of these two factors lends support to
the private sector’s argument that the industry requires strong patent rights to entice investment in important research. 166
However, a countervailing argument is that the field of biotechnology research offers a wealth of alternative incentives that motivate researchers to innovate.167 Whereas the
patent system incentivizes innovation with monetary rewards, many leading researchers—
often funded by government grants and nonprofit organizations—are motivated by alternative incentives, such as prestige, prizes, academic tenure, altruism, or mere scientific
curiosity.168 In the field of biotechnology, then, it is not unreasonable to argue that a substantial amount of scientific progress would continue even in the absence of the patent
system’s incentives.169 Put more generally, an industry with an abundance of alternative
incentives to innovate should require fewer incentives from the patent system.170 After all,
156. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1597-99.
157. Id. at 1581.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1581-82.
160. Id. at 1582.
161. Id. at 1676-77.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1677.
165. Id.
166. See Brief for Respondents at 5, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013) (No. 12398).
167. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1586.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id.
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why should society pay the patent system’s price if a steady supply of inventors not seeking patent exclusivity is available to provide the scientific progress the patent system seeks
to promote?171
Such a question depends in part on what kind of scientific progress patent exclusivity
seeks to promote.172 Under the more traditional account of the patent system, patent exclusivity provides ex-ante incentives that operate prior to the issuance of the patent. 173 In
other words, society benefits from the inventor’s discovery and disclosure of the patented
invention, and the inventor’s right to exclude others from the use of his invention is the
price society must pay to hold up its end of the bargain. 174 This traditional account of the
patent system was likely effective when inventions were primarily mechanical in nature,
but it is problematic when applied to modern sciences such as biotechnology, where an
initial patented invention often has no market value in and of itself, and further investment
is necessary to develop commercial applications of the initial invention. 175 Furthermore,
researchers motivated by alternative incentives to innovate, especially those in academia,
often do not direct their research toward the pursuit of such commercial applications.176
An alternative theory holds that patents also provide incentives that operate subsequent to the issuance of the patent. 177 These ex-post incentives motivate the inventor to
invest in the development of commercial applications of the invention during the patent
term, or in the alternative, to entice others to invest in developing commercial applications
through licensing.178 This alternative theory was apparently espoused by Congress when
it passed the Bayh-Dole Act.179 Congress passed the Act because it determined that federally funded researchers were not efficiently developing their basic research discoveries
into commercial applications.180 Its solution to the problem, as noted above, was to nudge
the biotechnology industry towards commercialization by allowing universities and nonprofit organizations to patent their basic research discoveries and encouraging them to
subsequently license their patents to private firms, who could develop them into commercial applications.181
Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg have argued that the Bayh-Dole Act’s
failure to distinguish fundamental research discoveries that enable further scientific investigation from downstream inventions that translate directly into commercial products
caused the patent system to encroach too far into the domain of open science, which may
impede rather than promote the progress of science. 182 This concept is directly applicable
171. See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1037.
172. See id. at 1024, 1037.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 16, at 1155; see also Rai, supra note 5, at 96. Some
scholars distinguish invention from innovation; notable economist Joseph Schumpeter, for example, has argued
that invention produces “no economically relevant effect at all,” while innovation brings about constant change
in the economic system. 1 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES 84-87 (1939).
176. Gina A. Kuhlman, Alliances for the Future: Cultivating a Cooperative Environment for Biotech Success,
11 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 311, 314 (1996).
177. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1036-38.
178. Id.
179. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980).
180. Rai, supra note 5, at 95.
181. Brian Zadorozny, The Advent of Gene Patenting: Putting the Great Debate in Perspective, 13 SMU SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (2009).
182. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW &
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to Myriad; the question of whether DNA patents encroach too far into the domain of open
science—so as to impede the progress of science rather than promote it—is the overarching question of innovation policy presented by the case. 183
In an attempt to aid and influence the courts in their resolution of Myriad, both parties to the case and numerous amici offered a plethora of policy arguments.184 Myriad and
similarly situated amici, largely consisting of for-profit entities, argued that Myriad and its
investors relied on strong patent rights when they “risked billions of dollars” to research
the BRCA genes, and therefore, Myriad needed patent exclusivity in order to recover its
investment in the molecules.185 Other amici warned that a holding in the plaintiffs’ favor
would have significant negative effects on America’s economy and on its position as a
leader in the biotechnology industry.186
Plaintiffs and their amici, consisting primarily of not-for-profit members of the research community, offered a variety of arguments to the contrary. 187 First, they argued that
the incentivization of innovation does not always require patent exclusivity, especially in
the context of genetic research.188 For example, scientists have developed genetic testing
for an assortment of diseases without pursuing patent rights, and Myriad’s competition in
the race to discover the BRCA genes came from scientists claiming to have no intention
of seeking patents on the genes.189
Also, plaintiffs and associated amici argued that patent exclusivity impedes progress
by preventing further downstream research and discovery. 190 Myriad’s amici responded by
arguing that members of the biotechnology industry rarely enforce patents against researchers, but the argument fell on deaf ears.191 Plaintiffs and their amici asserted that the
mere threat of litigation—and the resulting attorney’s fees and court costs—often prevents
researchers from taking the risk, especially those employed by non-profit entities.192 In
Myriad’s case, the fact that several plaintiffs ceased BRCA testing and research to settle

CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290-91 (2003).
183. Unfortunately, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit largely avoided addressing this question.
Patent Act, supra note 78, at 397.
184. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association, American Society of Human Genetics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Osteopathic Association, American College of Legal Medicine, and the Medical Society of the State of New York in Support of Petitioners, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) [hereinafter AMA Brief];
Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Neither Party, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) [hereinafter Lander Brief]; Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).
185. Brief for Respondents at 5, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398); see also Patent Act, supra note
78, at 394.
186. Brief for Amicus Curiae the Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of Respondents at 3, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No 12-398) [hereinafter Biotechnology Brief]; see also Patent Act, supra note 78,
at 394.
187. Patent Act, supra note 78, at 394.
188 See, e.g., AMA Brief, supra note 184, at 16 (stating that “[t]he majority of geneticists are willing to
undertake the research to discover genes and develop genetic tests without the possibility of a patent”).
189. See id. at 16; see also Reply Brief for Petitioners at 21, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).
190. See Brief for Petitioners at 42, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398); Brief Amici Curiae of the
National Women’s Health Network et al. in Support of Petitioners at 12-14, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No.
12-398).
191. See, e.g., Biotechnology Brief, supra note 186, at 33 (stating that, in the biotechnology industry, “rational
forbearance against researchers is the norm”).
192. Brief of Amicus Curiae AARP in Support of Petitioners at 4, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No 12-398); see also Patent
Act, supra note 78, at 395.
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pending lawsuits, while others did so to avoid litigation altogether, gave credence to the
argument.193 Lastly, plaintiffs and their amici argued that communication and collaboration, not exclusivity, are vital to scientific discovery. 194 To foster innovation, the scientific
community needs certain basic tools and scientific knowledge to remain in the public domain.195 For example, Myriad built its discovery of the BRCA genes on the work of other
scientists, including that of the Human Genome Project and Dr. King’s University of California, Berkeley research team. 196
B.

The Litigation Saga

In March of 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York invalidated all seven of Myriad’s patents. 197 In doing so, the court split the patents
into two categories and struck each category down for a different reason. 198 One category
of patent claims pertained to “isolated DNA containing all or portions of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 gene sequence[s].”199 The court found these “composition of matter” claims unpatentable based on the product of nature exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101. 200 The second
category of patents were those based on “methods for ‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ BRCA1
and BRCA2 gene sequences to identify the presence of mutations correlating with a predisposition to breast or ovarian cancer.” 201 The court invalidated this second category of
patents because it found that they were abstract mental processes, which are also not eligible for patent under § 101.202
On July 29, 2011, Myriad appealed and brought the case before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.203 The Federal Circuit presented a three-part decision: (1) “isolated” DNA molecules do not exist in nature and are thus patent-eligible,
(2) Myriad’s claim to a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics is not an abstract mental process and is also patent-eligible, and (3) Myriad’s method claims pertaining to “comparing” or “analyzing” DNA sequences are patent-ineligible abstract mental
193. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 204-06
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated
sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), and opinion vacated,
appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
1012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013).
194. Patent Act, supra note 78, at 396.
195. Brief of Professor Eileen M. Kane as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(No. 12-398).
196. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201; see also Patent Act, supra note 78, at 396.
197. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 238.
198. See id. at 185.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 185, 220.
201. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
202. Myriad, relying on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services, argued that the method claims were not abstract mental processes because they incorporated a transformation step and therefore passed the “machine or transformation” test from Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010). Id. at 233-37. The district court disagreed, holding there was no transformative step involved in Myriad’s
“comparing” and “analyzing” method claims. Id. at 234-37; see also infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
203. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012), and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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processes.204 The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which asked the Supreme
Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision relating to the patentability of isolated human genes.205 The Court issued a summary disposition206 that granted the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case
to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of the Court’s recent decision in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.207
In Mayo, the patents at issue related to methods for determining, in a patient-specific
manner, the most effective dose of thiopurine drugs used for the treatment of autoimmune
diseases.208 The method used correlations between metabolite levels in a patient’s blood
and the likelihood of ineffectiveness or negative side effects to precisely establish the
proper dose.209 Mayo, interestingly, was itself a case in which the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated a Federal Circuit decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of
a recently decided case—Bilski v. Kappos.210 The Federal Circuit’s pre-remand decision
in Mayo determined that the claims at issue were eligible for patent under the “machine or
transformation” test.211 In Bilski v. Kappos, however, the Supreme Court held that the machine or transformation test was not “a definitive test of patent eligibility, but only an
important and useful clue.” 212 The Court seemed to be hinting that it wanted the Federal
Circuit to incorporate some form of policy into its analysis of patent eligibility.213 On remand, the Federal Circuit determined that, even if the machine or transformation test was
not the definitive test of patent eligibility, its application to the claims in Mayo led to a
clear and compelling conclusion that the claims at issue were eligible for patent. 214 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time and reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision.215 Although the Court purported to rely on established general legal rules and case
law precedent, it also referenced its own repeated emphasis on the concern that patent law

204. Id. at 1334.
205. Plaintiffs also requested Supreme Court review of the Federal Circuit’s holding on an issue of standing,
but the Court chose not to disturb the Federal Circuit’s decision in that regard. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (No. 11-725).
206. Summary Disposition, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
207. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
208. Id. at 1290.
209. Id. at 1290-91.
210. Id. at 1296; see generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
211. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1342-43, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), rev’d, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012). The machine or transformation test, first articulated by the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson,
attempts to ascertain whether a process or method claim is tailored narrowly enough to embody a particular
application of a fundamental principle without pre-empting the principle itself; a claimed process or method is
sufficiently narrow if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article
into a different state or thing.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
212. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1296 (explaining the significance of
its holding in Bilski); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
213. The Court’s reiteration that its holding in Bilski stood for the proposition that the machine or transformation test was not the sole test for determining the patent eligibility of process or method claims suggests that
its remand of Mayo was effectively an invitation for the Federal Circuit to engage in a more flexible, policyinclusive analysis of whether the claims in dispute were eligible for patent. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132
S. Ct. at 1296.
214. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132
S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
215. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
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should not “inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature” as reinforcement of its decision. 216
After reconsideration of its Myriad holding in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Mayo, the Federal Circuit produced a carbon copy of its prior holding. 217 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that Mayo was not controlling on the issue of patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.218 It further explained that while Mayo “provide[d] valuable insights and
illuminate[d] broad, foundational principles,” the Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers cases
set out the framework for determining patent-eligibility of composition of matter claims. 219
Accordingly, the court held that Mayo did not affect its prior holding that isolated DNA
molecules are within the realm of patent-eligible subject matter.220 The Federal Circuit
then moved on to Myriad’s method claims; it determined that Mayo reinforced its previous
holding that the method claims directed to “comparing” or “analyzing” DNA sequences
were patent-ineligible and that the method claim for screening potential cancer therapeutics was patent-eligible.221 Plaintiffs again filed a petition for writ of certiorari, asking the
Supreme Court to determine whether human genes are patent eligible and whether the
Federal Circuit erred in upholding Myriad’s method patent for screening potential cancer
therapeutics.222
The Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the question of whether human genes
are eligible for patent.223 Although the Court received a substantial number of policy-based
arguments from the case’s numerous amici, it largely evaded the policy issue by basing its
decision on rules developed in its previous case law. 224 The Court offered a narrow, twopart holding: (1) a segment of DNA is a product of nature which is not patent-eligible by
virtue of its isolation from the human genome, and (2) cDNA is not naturally occurring
and is therefore patent-eligible.225 To arrive at this decision, the Court compared Myriad’s
patents to those in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers, examined the focus of the patents, and
determined that the past practice of the USPTO in granting patents for isolated genes was
not entitled to deference.226
The Court began its analysis by distinguishing Myriad’s isolated DNA patents from
the patent in Chakrabarty.227 In Chakrabarty, the genetically engineered bacterium had
“markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.” 228 In contrast, the Court
determined that Myriad did not create anything; the separation of the BRCA genes from
216. Id. at 1301-02, 1305.
217. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
218. Id. at 1325.
219. Id. at 1326.
220. Id. at 1333.
221. Id. at 1326.
222. Plaintiffs again included the standing question in its petition, and the Supreme Court again ignored it.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(No. 11-725).
223. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 695.
224. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116-17.
225. Id. at 2109.
226. Id. at 2116-19.
227. Id. at 2116-17.
228. Id. at 2117 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310
(1980)).
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the human genome may have been a groundbreaking discovery, but it was no act of invention.229 The Court found the subject matter of Myriad’s isolated DNA patents to be more
analogous to the subject matter of the patent considered in Funk Brothers.230 In Funk
Brothers, the Court’s primary objection to the patent was that its mixture of bacterial
strains did not alter the bacteria in any way. 231 Similarly, the Court found that Myriad did
not create or alter the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in any way.232 Rather, Myriad’s contribution was “uncovering” the location and sequence of the genes within their respective
chromosomes.233
Myriad attempted to distinguish its isolated DNA patents from the Funk Brothers
patent by emphasizing that isolating DNA from the human genome requires severance of
chemical bonds, resulting in a non-naturally occurring molecule. 234 The Court acknowledged and dismissed this argument, stating that Myriad had not expressed its patent claims
in terms of chemical composition.235 Rather, the isolated DNA claims primarily focused
on the genetic information encoded in the patented genes, which existed without any contribution from Myriad. 236 The Court illustrated this point by explaining that, if Myriad’s
patents depended on the creating a unique molecule, a patent infringer could avoid Myriad’s patent claims by isolating a DNA sequence containing the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene
and one additional nucleotide pair.237 Such an outcome would obviously frustrate the purpose of Myriad’s patents, because its claims concerned the information encoded within the
genes, not their chemical composition. 238 Myriad’s final argument on the issue was that
the USPTO’s past practice of awarding patents on genes was entitled to deference. 239 The
Court quickly dispatched this argument, noting that the United States itself, as amicus curiae, argued against the practice of granting patents on isolated DNA sequences. 240 Ultimately, the Court held that Myriad’s isolated DNA patents fell squarely within the product
of nature exception, rendering them invalid. 241
The Supreme Court addressed Myriad’s cDNA patent claims much more concisely.242 The AMP conceded that cDNA is in no way a naturally occurring molecule, but
argued that it should not be eligible for patent because its nucleotide sequence is dictated
by nature and not by the laboratory technician. 243 The Court acknowledged the truth of the
premise underlying the AMP’s argument, but reasoned that the laboratory technician still
229. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2116.
233. Id.
234. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. However, Dr. Eric Lander asserted in his amicus brief that the scientific
community has long been aware of the occurrence of isolated DNA fragments in the human body. Lander Brief,
supra note 184, at 12. The Court gave considerable attention to Dr. Lander’s brief on this point during oral
argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-40, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118.
239. Id.
240. The Court provided further support for its conclusion by discussing Congress’ failure to legislatively
endorse the USPTO’s longstanding practice of granting genetic patents. Id. at 2118-19.
241. Id. at 2117.
242. See id. at 2119.
243. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119; Brief for Petitioner at 49, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).
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unquestionably creates something new when he synthesizes cDNA.244 The Court held that
a molecule of cDNA is distinct from the molecule of DNA from which it was created. 245
Consequently, cDNA is not a product of nature, making it patent eligible under Section
101 of the Patent Act.246
C.

Policy Avoidance and Missed Opportunity

The Supreme Court asserted in Mayo that Congress holds the responsibility of crafting finely tailored rules to resolve industry-specific issues of patent policy.247 While Congress has shown a tepid willingness to pass industry-specific patent legislation, it has done
so in a piecemeal fashion rather than promulgating comprehensive statutes to fully address
the needs of any one industry. 248 Some commentators have suggested that the biotechnology industry should have its own sui generis patent system, but Professor Rai argues the
legislature is as ill-equipped as the courts to provide a permanent solution to the industry’s
ever-changing and amorphous patent needs.249 Unless Congress chooses to undertake this
seemingly herculean task, the courts must resolve patent disputes by interpreting the existing Patent Act, which remains largely unchanged since 1952.250 However, if the last six
decades of technological advancements and emerging industries have not prompted Congress to make any substantial changes to update patent law, it is plausible that Congress is
satisfied with the ability of the federal courts to adapt their reading of the Patent Act to
accommodate the unique demands of diverse industries and technologies. 251
Unfortunately, the institutional constraints faced by the federal courts leave them ill
equipped to reconcile the disparate interests held by different sectors of the biotechnology
industry.252 One such constraint the federal courts face is that of limited resources. 253 Another is that federal courts often lack technical competence. 254 For example, judges on the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was created primarily to adjudicate patent
cases, are not required to have technical backgrounds—and most do not.255 Even a judge
with a technical background, however, could not hope to be technically competent in the
all of the vastly diverse disciplines within the scope of the Patent Act.256

244. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304-05 (2011).
248. For example, Congress has extended the patent term for many pharmaceutical patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 15556 (2000), prohibited enforcement of medical procedure patents against doctors, id. § 287 (2000), and relaxed
the obviousness standard as it applies to biotechnology processes, id. § 103(b) (2000). See also Burk & Lemley,
Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1631.
249. Professor Rai argues that the difficulties associated with biotechnology arise not from legal standards
themselves, but instead from the courts’ faulty application of the standards. Rai, supra note 16, at 841-42. She
then provides three objections to the promulgation of a sui generis regime for biotechnology patents: (1) special
interest groups may have substantial influence over the resultant legislation, (2) the administrative costs would
be significant, and (3) there is no reason to believe that a sui generis approach would provide sufficient flexibility
to accommodate the ever-changing nature of the biotechnology industry. Id. at 842.
250. See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-212.
251. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1674.
252. Rai, supra note 99, at 837.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 837-38.
255. Id. at 838.
256. Id. at 837-38.
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The proper role of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court in their interpretation of the Patent Act is the subject of much debate. 257 Some commentators adhere to the view that, in light of the complex nature of patent law, the courts
should avoid policy considerations altogether and implement a formalistic and rule-based
approach to their intellectual property jurisprudence. 258 Indeed, the judges of the Federal
Circuit have generally indicated that they should avoid expressing their own policy views
in written opinions.259 This view is in accord with the traditional notion that the judiciary
should exercise restraint against implementing its own policy preferences when interpreting statutory language.260 On the other hand, a seemingly overwhelming portion of the
academic community advances the view that the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
should more actively analyze innovation policy in patent cases. 261
Rather conveniently, professor David Taylor recently published a thoughtful article
that neatly gathered the critical views of several notable professors on the perceived formalistic nature of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence. 262 Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss, for
example, has argued that the Patent Act requires “common law elaboration,” and that Federal Circuit judges should consider “whether the law is developing in a manner that reflects
policies that meet the needs of the creative sector and further federal interests in promoting
technological progress.”263 Professor Rai has also criticized the Federal Circuit’s formalism.264 She has advanced the argument that the history and language of the Patent Act
suggest that Congress intended to delegate patent law policymaking to the judiciary, which
should accept this responsibility by incorporating innovation policy into its patent law jurisprudence.265 Several other professors have expressed similar views,266 and although each
has his or her own unique take on the Federal Circuit’s appropriate role, a common thread
exists: the Federal Circuit should do a better job of articulating policy-based justifications
for its holdings in patent cases.267
Although commentators have directed the bulk of their criticisms toward the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court has not altogether escaped similar scrutiny. 268 However, the
general consensus among commentators is that the Supreme Court has been much more
open to discussing innovation policy in its patent cases.269 Perhaps more importantly, the
257. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 16, at 640-52.
258. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1673-74.
259. Taylor, supra note 16, at 640-45.
260. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1673-74.
261. This criticism is more often aimed at the Federal Circuit; some commentators argue the specialized nature
of the court and the failure of other institutions to take responsibility for establishing patent policy make it the
best option to articulate substantive patent policy. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 16, at 645.
262. Id. at 645-52.
263. With respect to patent law’s need for “common law elaboration,” Professor Dreyfuss compares the Patent
Act to the Sherman Act. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELY TECH. L. J. 787, 800, 801 (2008); see also Taylor, supra note 16, at 648.
264. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging in Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1101-03 (2003); see also Taylor, supra note 16, at 649.
265. Rai, supra note 264, at 1040-41.
266. See generally Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419 (2012);
Thomas, supra note 16; Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16.
267. Taylor, supra note 16, at 652.
268. Id. at 672.
269. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (explaining why the nonobviousness
standard needed to be raised); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732-35
(2002) (justifying retention of the doctrine of equivalents); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548
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Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to engage in a discourse with the Federal Circuit on how to best implement innovation policy in patent cases.270 Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not consistently expressed the same willingness to participate in this discourse.271
Similar to its remand in Mayo, the Supreme Court’s remand of Myriad presented a
prime opportunity for the Federal Circuit to implement innovation policy into its opinion.272 That the doctrine at issue—subject-matter eligibility—was one not closely circumscribed by the language of the Patent Act ads weight to this argument. 273 This is not necessarily to say that the result would have been different if the Federal Circuit had done so;
even if it determined that innovation policy discouraged DNA patents, it might have been
constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis.274 By engaging in a reasoned analysis of innovation policy, though, the Federal Circuit could have framed the issues more thoroughly
for the Supreme Court, enabling it to make effective use of the Federal Circuit’s expertise
without necessarily deferring to its judgment. 275 Additionally, such a policy analysis would
have supplied the district courts with a better understanding of how to address subjectmatter eligibility in the future. 276
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court responded to the Federal Circuit’s avoidance of
innovation policy with its own avoidance of the same.277 This is especially surprising given
that the Court’s opinion in Mayo seemingly took a step toward incorporating innovation
policy into its subject-matter eligibility analysis.278 Its subsequent avoidance of innovation
policy in Myriad will likely foster uncertainty in the lower courts about the proper role of
innovation policy in the nation’s patent law jurisprudence moving forward. 279 Thus, although the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad appears to strike a desirable balance between the competing interests of the biotechnology community, the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit nevertheless missed a valuable opportunity to engage in a meaningful
discourse about innovation policy and its proper role in the courts’ patent law jurisprudence.
A possible justification for the Court’s avoidance of innovation policy in Myriad is
its lack of expertise and experience with patent law. 280 It may have decided that avoiding
a policy analysis altogether was a better alternative to a possibly faulty or incomplete policy analysis, especially given the controversial nature of the patent claims at hand. 281 In-

U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that granting too much patent protection
can run counter to the constitutional objective of patent protection); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 801-03;
Taylor, supra note 16, at 637.
270. Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 801-02.
271. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 16, at 674.
272. See supra nn.208-16 and accompanying text.
273. Subject matter eligibility is not closely circumscribed by statute because the language of 35 U.S.C. § 101
leaves much of the doctrine’s application to the discretion of the courts. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 678.
274. See id. It is important to note, however, that the en banc Federal Circuit is not bound by its own precedent.
Id. at 656.
275. See id.; Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 796.
276. Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 805.
277. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116-20 (2013).
278. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304-05 (2011).
279. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116-20.
280. See Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 802.
281. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116-20.
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deed, some might applaud the Supreme Court’s abstention from articulating issues of innovation policy that the Federal Circuit could arguably address more effectively. 282
IV. CONCLUSION
The application of the patent system to biotechnology discoveries presents complex
issues of innovation policy.283 Legal and economic theorists rarely agree on how to best
resolve these issues, but a substantial portion of commentators agree that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court should incorporate some form of reasoned policy analysis in their patent law jurisprudence. 284 Although Myriad presented a
clear opportunity for the two courts to engage in a discourse about the proper role of innovation policy in the resolution of patent cases, neither court took advantage of this opportunity. Unless such a discourse is established in the future, innovation policy’s place in
United States patent law jurisprudence will remain a question mark.
—Dru Prosser*

282. Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 802.
283. See generally Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 63; Rai, supra note 5, at 95-96.
284. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 645-52.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Tulsa College of Law, 2015. I would like to thank my colleagues on the
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